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Abstract
Many have claimed that whenever an investigation might provide evidence for a
claim, it might also provide evidence against it. Similarly, many have claimed that
your credence should never be on the edge of the range of credences that you think
might be rational. Surprisingly, both of these principles imply that you cannot
rationally be modest : you cannot be uncertain what the rational opinions are.
Do I like lentils?
I’m guessing you’re not sure. Yet, given your evidence (philosopher; strange writer;
mentioned lentils in an Analysis paper...), there are some opinions you ought to have
now. And when (in a few pages) you get new evidence—and, let’s suppose, you don’t
lose any old evidence—there will be some new opinions you ought to have then. Let ‘P ’
and ‘P+’ be definite descriptions for these current and future rational opinions.1
How—if at all—should your opinions about P and P+ constrain your other opinions
(say, about lentils)? Many have endorsed principles that prevent your opinions from
being on the edge of the range of potentially-rational opinions (§1):
(Step Away) If P (q) = t and P (P (q) > t) > 0, then P (P (q) < t) > 0.
If you should have a given credence and should leave open that the current rational
credence might be higher, then you should also leave open that it might be lower.
(Stay Away) If P (q) = t and P (P+(q) > t) > 0, then P (P+(q) < t) > 0.
If you should have a given credence and should leave open that the future rational
credence might be higher, then you should also leave open that it might be lower.
Surprisingly (§2), each principle implies that you cannot rationally be modest—you
cannot be uncertain what the current rational opinions are. Precisely: for all q there is
a t such that P (P (q) = t) = 1. (So if you’re unsure how confident you should be that I
like lentils, you’re irrational.) Arguably, this implies they’re both false.
1I’ll model them with precise probabilities (White 2009; Joyce 2010; Schoenfield 2012), and assume
intrapersonal uniqueness: at each time (given your evidence, standards of reasoning, etc.) there is
uniquely rational credence function (cf. White 2005; Horowitz 2014b; Schoenfield 2014; Schultheis 2018).
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1 Why think they’re true?
Start with Stay Away. This principle follows from (but is much weaker than) rational-
ized versions of diachronic Reflection principles—principles which entail that the current
rational credence equals the current rational estimate of the future rational credence.
To see this, let E(P+(q)) be the current rational expectation of the future rational
credence in q. (Precisely, E(P+(q)) :=
∑
t P (P
+(q) = t) · t.) Diachronic, rational Re-
flection principles are those which entail that P (q) = E(P+(q)). Now note that if Stay
Away fails, then there is an ε > 0 such that E(P+(q)) = P (P+(q) = t) ·t+P (P+(q) > t) ·
(t+ ε) > t = P (q), so diachronic Reflection fails too. Thus authors who endorse such
Reflection principles are committed to Stay Away (e.g. van Fraassen 1984; Gaifman
1988; Weisberg 2007; Briggs 2009; Mahtani 2017).
Moreover—and independently—several authors have argued that there should be a
ban on ‘no lose’ investigations: investigations which have some chance of confirming a
claim without a chance of disconfirming it.2 (If you think asking might increase your
confidence that I like lentils, you should also think that doing so might decrease it.)
Stay Away looks to be a formalization of that seemingly-banal claim.
Yet that seemingly-banal claim has the surprising consequence that you must be
immodest. That’s the point of this paper.
It’s a fair point. But is it an old one? Bernhard Salow has recently argued that we
should generalize the ban on ‘no lose’ investigations to a ban on ‘intentionally biased
inquiries’ (Salow 2018, §1.1)—i.e. inquiries that you should expect to provide evidence
favoring q. And banning the latter, he claims, requires immodesty.
It’s a clever argument. But there are ways to question it.
First, Salow’s ban on ‘biased inquiries’ is much stronger than the ban on ‘no lose’
investigations formalized by Stay Away. It requires your expectation of the current
rational credences to match your expectation of the future rational credences. (Where
E(P (q)) :=
∑
t P (P (q) = t) · t, that is the claim that E(P (q)) = E(P+(q)).) He goes on to
assume, in effect, that this will hold in general only if rationalized diachronic Reflection
holds: P (q) = E(P+(q)) (Salow 2018, §3.2).
Second, Salow makes the controversial assumption that rational credences are are
always recoverable by conditioning a known prior on propositional evidence (2018, §3.1).
Some (e.g. Gallow 2019b, §1) have argued that this assumption is the culprit.
And third, it’s controversial whether Salow has correctly formulated what it takes
for an inquiry to be ‘biased’. Gallow (2019b, §3) shows that we can avoid Salow’s
result using a causalist conception bias. Das (2020b, §1) formulates a notion of a biased
inquiry as one which guarantees a rise in credence. And Dorst (2020a, §7) shows that
some inquiries which are ‘biased’ in Salow’s sense are such that you should expect the
the future rational credences to be more accurate than your own on every proposition
(cf. Levinstein 2019), and so perhaps should not be thought of as ‘biased’—or, at least,
should not be banned as irrational.
2See White 2006; Titelbaum 2010; Salow 2018. Gallow 2019b and Das 2020b discuss subtly different
principles—the result of this paper does not directly apply to them.
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Given these concerns, it’s natural to wonder whether we can avoid Salow’s immodest
conclusion by weakening his ban on ‘biased inquiries’ back to one on ‘no lose’ invest-
igations. My claim is that this will not help: using the weaker constraint of Stay
Away—and making no assumptions about whether rational credences are determined
via conditioning—we still end up with immodesty.
Now turn to Step Away. This is an example of a bridging principle connecting first-
and higher-order rational opinions (Dorst 2020b, §1). It says that you cannot rationally
have a credence that’s on the edge of the range of credences you think might be rational.
In other words, if you think ‘my credence that he likes lentils is definitely not too high,
and it might be too low’, then you’re irrational (Christensen 2010b, §1). Something like
this has been defended or explored by a variety of theorists who have taken it to be a
tenable bridging principle that allows rational modesty.3 But it doesn’t.
Similarly to above, Step Away follows from rationalized, synchronic versions of
Reflection principles—principles which imply that you should match your credence to
your estimate of the current rational credence: P (q) = E(P (q)). It’s now known that
even the weakest such Reflection principles rule out immodesty (Samet 2000, §7.2, Dorst
2019, §2.3.1). But again, it’s natural to wonder whether we can avoid this conclusion by
weakening the principle to one that simply bans being on the edge of the potentially-
rational range. My claim is that this will not help.
2 Why think they’re false?
Step 1: Stay Away implies Step Away. Step 2: If modesty can be rational, it can
be rational for someone who knows the structural constraints on rationality—like Step
Away. Step 3: But (theorem:) if Step Away is true, then this is not possible.
Step 1: Stay Away implies Step Away.
Suppose Step Away fails: there’s a case in which you should have credence t that
I like lentils (q), leave open that the current rational credence might be higher, and be
certain that it’s no lower. Now take a version of this scenario in which it’s certain that
you’ll get no lentil-relevant evidence—for example, all you’ll learn is how a fair coin
landed. Then P (P (q) = P+(q)) = 1, so it follows that Stay Away fails too.
What if we restricted Stay Away to apply only in cases in which you might get
evidence relevant to q? Still no good. For then we can take a case where Step Away
fails at threshold P (q) = t and where you might get relevant evidence about q, but where
this will (i) only happen if P (q) > t and (ii) it will not push the future rational credence
below t. For example, suppose Step Away fails in this way: the rational credence is
0.5 that I like lentils, but you should leave open (only) that it’s either 0.5 or 0.6. Then
we can imagine a version of this case in which if the current rational credence is 0.5,
you’ll get no relevant evidence, but if it’s 0.6, then the future rational credence will shift
3See Christensen (2007, §5), Christensen (2010b, §1), Sliwa and Horowitz (2015, §4.4), Kappel (2017,
§1), Skipper et al. (2018, §2), Gallow (2019a, §4.1), Fraser (2020, §4). Also compare Step Away to the
‘rationality dominance’ principles in Schultheis (2018, §2) and Hawthorne and Isaacs (2020, §3).
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to either 0.5 or 0.7. Then Stay Away fails even though you might get lentil-relevant
evidence.4
Upshot: Stay Away is tenable only if Step Away is.
Step 2: If modesty can be rational, it can be rational for someone who knows the struc-
tural constraints on rationality.
We can distinguish structural from substantive constraints on rationality. The former
are constraints—like probabilism and the Principal Principle (Lewis 1980)—that hold
regardless of what evidence you have or what propositions we’re applying them to. The
latter are constraints that depend on the specifics: ‘Given evidence E, you should be
60% confident that Kevin likes lentils’, etc. On this classification, Step Away is clearly
a structural constraint.
Plausibly, if modesty can be rational, then it can be rational for someone who knows
the structural constraints on rationality—and hence knows Step Away. Two reasons.
First, it’s widely accepted that structural principles do not pin down a uniquely
rational credence function; thus given our assumption of (intrapersonal) uniqueness
(footnote 1), there plausibly are substantive constraints that outrun the true structural
constraints. As such, someone who knows the latter can still be unsure about the former,
and hence still be unsure what opinions to have, given their evidence. (Study all the
epistemology you like, you can still be unsure how confident you ought to be that I like
lentils.) At the very least, this has been the working assumption in most of the literature
(e.g. Christensen 2010b; Cresto 2012; Lasonen-Aarnio 2013, 2015; Horowitz 2014a; Sliwa
and Horowitz 2015; Schoenfield 2016a; Roush 2016, 2017; Salow 2018; Gallow 2019b;
Das 2020a,b).
Second, even if structural constraints do pin down a uniquely rational credence
function for each body of evidence, this doesn’t make modesty irrational. For, as many
have argued, you can still be unsure what your evidence is (e.g. Williamson 2000, Ch. 9,
Williamson 2008, Horowitz 2014a, §6, Lasonen-Aarnio 2015, Das 2020a, §4.1, Das 2020b,
§1.2). And even if you know what credences are warranted by each body of evidence,
uncertainty about which body of evidence you have can still induce modesty. (For
example, in the model specified in footnote 4, you know all conditionals of the form ‘If
I’m at world w, the rational credence function is ’, and yet you still should be modest
4 For aficionados, here’s a toy model of such a case, using stochastic-matrix notation (Dorst 2020b,
§2): row i column j gives the probability that the rational credence at world i assigns to being at world
j. At time 1, the possible rational credences are these:

0.2 0.3 0.075 0.175 0.125 0.125
0.2 0.3 0.075 0.175 0.125 0.125
0 0 0.15 0.35 0.25 0.25
0 0 0.15 0.35 0.25 0.25
0 0 0.15 0.35 0.25 0.25
0 0 0.15 0.35 0.25 0.25
. There
are six worlds, and the ones where I like lentils are q = {w1, w4, w6}, as indicated by the blue columns.
At worlds 1 and 2, P (q) = 0.5 (sum across blue columns in the first and second rows); and at worlds
3–6, P (q) = 0.6. Now let the time-2 rational credences be these:

0.2 0.3 0.075 0.175 0.125 0.125
0.2 0.3 0.075 0.175 0.125 0.125
0 0 0.3 0.7 0 0
0 0 0.3 0.7 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5
0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5
.
Thus at worlds 1 and 2 the rational credences stay the same; at worlds 3 and 4, the rational credence in
q rises from 0.6 to 0.7; and at worlds 5 and 6 it falls from 0.6 to 0.5. Thus at world 1, P (P+(q) ≥ 0.5) = 1
and P (P+(q) > 0.5) > 0, but P (q) = 0.5: Stay Away fails.
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since you should be unsure what world you’re at.)
Step 3: But if Step Away is true, anyone who knows the structural constraints on
rationality cannot be modest.
Letting Immodest be the claim that the rational credence function is certain that
it’s rational (for all q, t, if P (q) = t, then P (P (q) = t) = 1), we have:
Theorem. If Step Away holds and P (Step Away) = 1, then P (Immodest) = 1.
In other words: whenever it’s rational to be (correctly) sure of Step Away, it’s rational
to be certain that you should be immodest. (Proof in the Appendix.)
If evidence is factive (Williamson 2000, Ch. 9) and (in finite cases) you should be
sure of q only if your evidence entails it, then it follows immediately from this result
that you should be immodest: from P (Immodest) = 1, we can infer Immodest.
Moreover, if being rationally sure that you ought to φ implies that it’s permissible
to φ, then again it follows from this result that you should be immodest. To see this,
let ‘p’ mean ‘it ought to be that p’ (and ♦p := ¬¬p), and let C be your actual
credence function. Then ‘P (q) = t’ can be rewritten as ‘(C(q) = t)’. So the con-
clusion of our Theorem—that P (Immodest) = 1—implies that you’re rationally sure
that your credence function ought to be immodest: P ((C is immodest)) = 1. By the
above assumption, it follows that it’s permissible for your credence function to be im-
modest: ♦(C is immodest). But given uniqueness, what’s permissible for your credence
function is required of it, so it follows that your credence function is required to be
immodest: (C is immodest), i.e. P is immodest.
Of course, you might reject the factivity of evidence or the claim that being ra-
tionally sure that you must φ makes it permissible to φ. Even so, it follows dir-
ectly from the Theorem that a rational person who knows Step Away cannot be
unsure whether the credence function they have is rational. Precisely: if ‘π’ is a
rigid designator for their credence function, then the Theorem implies that either
π(P = π) = 1 or π(P = π) = 0; they cannot have any intermediate credence in the
rationality of their credence function. After all, if they are rational and know Step
Away, then π(Step Away) = 1 and π satisfies Step Away. If π(P = π) < 1, then
Immodest ⇒ [P 6= π], thus by the Theorem, π(Immodest) = 1 ≤ π(P 6= π), hence
π(P = π) = 0. Thus either π(P = π) = 1 or π(P = π) = 0. But if modesty can be
rational, surely being intermediately modest—having a credence strictly between 0 and
1 in your own rationality—can be rational.
Thus, I claim, Stay Away and Step Away are not interestingly weaker than the
strongest bridging principles, which simply rule out immodesty entirely (Dorst 2019;
Skipper 2020). For by Step 1, if either principle is true, then Step Away is true; by
Step 2, if Step Away is true and modesty can be rational, then it can be rational
for someone who knows Step Away; but by Step 3, this can’t be rational. So either
rationality requires immodesty, or Stay Away and Step Away are false.
The surprising step in this argument is the Theorem. Why is it true? As with other
results about the strength of bridging principles (e.g. Samet 2000; Williamson 2000,
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2014, 2019; Elga 2013; Lasonen-Aarnio 2013, 2015; Dorst 2019, 2020a; Das 2020b), it’s
due to the fact that Step Away is an (implicitly) universally quantified claim, and thus
that it’s difficult to satisfy it for all propositions.
In particular note that Step Away straightforwardly entails:
Positive Access: If P (q) = 1, then P (P (q) = 1) = 1.
If you should be sure of q, then you should be sure that you should be.
For suppose that Positive Access fails: for some q, P (q) = 1, but P (P (q) = 1) < 1.
Then you should have credence 1 in q, should leave open that maybe your credence
should be lower, but should be certain that it shouldn’t be higher—contradicting Step
Away.
Once we see that Step Away implies Positive Access, it’s not hard to see that
it’s unstable. For if you should have any higher-order uncertainty at all, then there will
be some set of credences t1 < t2 · · · < tn, such that you should (1) leave open that
any of them might be the rational credence in q, and (2) be certain that one of them
is. By Positive Access, you should also be certain that you should be certain that
one of them is rational—meaning that in the possibility where t1 is the rational one,
you should likewise be certain that one of the t1, ..., tn is rational. But that means that
in such a possibility, the rational credence (namely, t1) is on the edge of the range of
credences you should think might be rational—Step Away fails.
What should we make of this result? Since modesty (arguably) is rational5, both
Stay Away and Step Away are (arguably) false. That means that (arguably) no-lose
investigations are possible, and that it can be rational to think ‘My 60% credence that
he likes lentils is definitely not too high, and it might be too low’ and yet maintain
your credence. At the very least, those who have appealed to bans on these possibilities
should be aware that such they are more controversial than is standardly thought.6
P.S. Good guess—I do like lentils.
Appendix
Theorem. If Step Away holds and P (Step Away) = 1, then P (Immodest) = 1.
Assume there is a finite number of (relevant) possibilities W , and that at each world w
there is a unique probability function Pw (defined over the subsets of W ) that captures
the rational credences for you to have. Thus for any proposition (set of worlds) q and
number t, a proposition like [P (q) = t] is simply the set of worlds where this is so:
[P (q) = t] := {w ∈W | Pw(q) = t}. For example, Pw(P (q) > t) = Pw({w′ ∈W |Pw′(q) > t}).
5See Williamson (2000, 2008, 2014); Christensen (2010a, 2020); Cresto (2012); Elga (2013); Lasonen-
Aarnio (2013, 2015, 2019, 2020); Horowitz (2014a); Pettigrew and Titelbaum (2014); Sliwa and Horowitz
(2015); Roush (2016, 2017); Schoenfield (2016b, 2017); Carr (2019a,b); Dorst (2019, 2020a,b); Fraser
(2020).
6Many thanks to Rachel Fraser, Dmitri Gallow, Bernhard Salow, and two stellar referees for helpful
discussion and feedback.
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(Note: whereas ‘P ’ in the main text was a definite description whose value varied across
worlds, ‘Pw’ is a rigid designator for a particular probability function associated with
w.) This is a standard way of modeling higher-order probabilities from epistemic logic;
see e.g. Gaifman (1988); Samet (2000); Williamson (2000, 2014, 2019); Lasonen-Aarnio
(2013, 2015); Salow (2018, 2019); Dorst (2019, 2020a,b); Das (2020a,b).
Step Away holds at world w iff every instance of it is true there, i.e. iff for all q, t:
if Pw(q) = t and Pw(P (q) > t) > 0, then Pw(P (q) < t) > 0. Note that this is so iff for all
q, t: if Pw(q) = t and Pw(P (q) < t) > 0, then Pw(P (q) > t) > 0.
Now take an arbitrary world w and suppose both that Step Away holds there and
that Pw(Step Away) = 1. To establish the Theorem, we show that Pw(Immodest) = 1,
i.e. that if Pw(x) > 0, then for all q, t: if Px(q) = t then Px(P (q) = t) = 1.
First define the binary relation R between worlds such that for all x, y ∈W : xRy iff
Px(y) > 0; and let Rx := {y|wRy}. We build up to the result by establishing various
properties that R must have, given our suppositions.
Lemma 1 (Shift-Transitivity) For all x ∈ Rw, if xRy then Ry ⊆ Rx.
Proof. Suppose x ∈ Rw, so Pw(x) > 0. By supposition, this means Step Away holds at
x. Since xRy, we have Px(y) > 0. Suppose for reductio that Ry 6⊆ Rx, i.e. that there is a
z such that Py(z) > 0 and Px(z) = 0. Then since Px(y) > 0 and y ∈ {w′|Pw′(z) > 0} =
[P (z) > 0], we have that Px(P (z) > 0) > 0, yet Px(z) = 0 and of course Px(P (z) < 0) = 0,
violating Step Away at x. Contradiction.
Lemma 2 (w-Transitivity) For all x ∈ Rw: Rx ⊆ Rw.
Proof. The reasoning is the same is in Lemma 1. If Pw(x) > 0 and Px(y) > 0 yet
Pw(y) = 0, then Pw(P (y) > 0) > 0 yet Pw(P (y) < 0) = 0, violating Step Away.
Lemma 3 (Shift-Reflexivity) If wRx, then xRx.
Proof. For reductio, suppose not: there is some x such that wRx but 6xRx. Thus





, so m is in
{w} ∪Rw and within that set has maximal probability for x. (Since W is finite, such a
maximum exists.) Suppose this probability is Pm(x) = tm. We show that Step Away
fails at m.
We know Rm ⊆ Rw, for either m = w (so it holds trivially) or m ∈ Rw (so Lemma
2 establishes it). Since Pm(x) is maximal within {w} ∪ Rw, it follows that Pm(x) is
maximal within Rm, so that (i) Pm(P (x) > tm) = 0. Moreover note that that (ii) tm =
Pm(x) > 0 since Pw(x) > 0 and by construction Pm(x) is at least as high as Pw(x).
Finally, since Pm(x) > 0 and Px(x) = 0, we have that (iii) Pm(P (x) < tm) > 0. But
(i)–(iii) imply that Step Away fails at m.
We know m ∈ {w}∪Rw. If m = w, this contradicts our supposition that Step Away
holds there; if m ∈ Rw this contradicts our supposition that Pw(Step Away) = 1.
Lemma 4 (Shift-Symmetry) If wRx, then if xRy, also yRx.
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. So m is in {x} ∪ Rx and within this set has maximal probab-
ility for x; suppose Pm(x) = tm. We show that Step Away fails at m.
We know Rm ⊆ Rx, for either m = x (so it holds trivially) or m ∈ Rx (so Lemma
1 establishes it). Since Pm(x) is maximal within {x} ∪ Rx, it follows that Pm(x) is
maximal within Rm, and so that (i) Pm(P (x) > tm) = 0. Moreover, since by Lemma 3
xRx, so Px(x) > 0, it follows that since x ∈ {x} ∪Rx, (ii) tm = Pm(x) > 0.
Finally, since by supposition xRy, it follows that mRy—for since m ∈ {x} ∪ Rx,
either m = x (in which case it follows trivially), or else m ∈ Rx, in which case m ∈ Rw
(by Lemma 2, since x ∈ Rw and xRm), and so since mRx, by Lemma 1 it follows that
since xRy, that mRy. This means that Pm(y) > 0. But since 6yRx, Py(x) = 0 < tm, so
that (iii) Pm(P (q) < tm) > 0.
Yet (i)–(iii) show that Step Away fails at m. We know that m ∈ Rw (since m = x
or m ∈ Rx), so this contradicts our supposition that Pw(Step Away) = 1.
Lemma 5 (Shift-Equivalence) If wRx, then for all y ∈ Rx we have Ry = Rx.
Proof. Suppose wRx. By Lemma 1, we know that for all y ∈ Rx: (i) Ry ⊆ Rx. By
Lemma 4, we know that for all y ∈ Rx, yRx. And since Lemma 2 tells us that y ∈ Rw,
it follows from Lemma 1 that since yRx, that (ii) Rx ⊆ Ry. (i) and (ii) imply that
Ry = Rx.
Lemma 6 (Shift-Immodesty) wRx⇒ for all q, t: if Px(q) = t then Px(P (q) = t) = 1.
Proof. For reductio, suppose not: wRx and there is a q, t such that Px(q) = t but
Px(P (q) = t) < 1. By Lemma 3, Px(x) > 0, so that P (P (q) = t) > 0. It follows that
there is a set of values S = {s ∈ R| Px(P (q) = s) > 0} and that |S| ≥ 2, since t is one
such value but since Px(P (q) = t) < 1, it is not the only one. Since W is finite, so is S.
Now take the minimal value s0 ∈ S, and a world y such that xRy and Py(q) = s0. By
Lemma 5, Ry = Rx, and therefore {s ∈ R|Py(P (q) = s) > 0} = S. Thus by construction
Py(q) = s0 while Py(P (q) > s0) > 0 and Py(P (q) < s0) = 0, so Step Away fails at y.
Since xRy and wRx, it follows by Lemma 2 that wRy, contradicting our supposition
that Pw(Step Away) = 1.
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